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NOTES
THE FINAL WORD ON INVENTORY
SEARCHES?-SOUTH DAKOTA V. OPPERMAN
The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears.'
In recent years a perplexing problem has arisen concerning police
inventory searches2 of impounded automobiles. The authority for the
police to impound motor vehicles is established clearly by statute in
most states. ' Once a vehicle lawfully is impounded, the question is
whether a search by the police without a warrant and without probable
cause is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.' The United
States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman5 recently gave
1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971).
2. See Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Automobile: A Willing Suspension of
Disbelief, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 203 (1976). See also Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures
of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 848 (1974).
3. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, §4-203 (1975):
Removal of motor vehicles or other vehicles-Towing or hauling away:
(a) When a vehicle is abandoned, or left unattended, on a toll highway,
interstate highway, or expressway for 2 hours or more, its removal by a towing
service may be authorized by a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction.
(b) When a vehicle is abandoned on a highway in an urban district 10 hours
or more, its removal by a towing service may be authorized by a law enforcement
agency having jurisdiction.
(c) When a vehicle is abandoned or left unattended on a highway other than
a toll highway, interstate highway, or expressway, outside of an urban district
for 24 hours or more, its removal by a towing service may be authorized by a
law enforcement agency having jurisdiction.
(d) When an abandoned, unattended, wrecked, burned or partially disman-
tled vehicle is creating a traffic hazard because of its position in relation to the
highway or its physical appearance is causing the impeding of traffic, its imme-
diate removal from the highway or private property adjacent to the highway by
a towing service may be authorized by a law enforcement agency having juris-
diction.
See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE, §22651 (West 1971).
4. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirma-
tion and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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judicial approval to such inventory searches, thus opening the door to
further deterioration of the Fourth Amendment rights of motorists.
In Opperman, the defendant's automobile was parked in a metered
stall in the Vermillion, South Dakota business district in violation of a
local ordinance.' After the issuance of two parking tickets, the automo-
bile was towed to the city impoundment lot. At the time, the car doors
were locked and the windows were rolled up. After opening the locked
car door, the police proceeded to conduct a standard inventory search
of the vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of a small quantity of
marijuana in the closed glove compartment. Opperman subsequently
was arrested and convicted for possession of marijuana. On appeal, the
South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the
evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.7 The
United States Supreme Court ultimately concluded, however, that the
inventory search was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.' The
Court held that when the police have lawfully impounded an automo-
bile, they may search it without a search warrant and without probable
cause if they are following standard police procedures. This Note will
analyze the rationale for the Court's decision and will discuss alterna-
tive solutions to the practical problem presented in Opperman.
DETERMINING APPLICABLE STANDARDS
The first issue that must be confronted when attempting to determine
the legality of the inventory search is whether it is indeed a "search"
for Fourth Amendment purposes Although the Supreme Court consis-
6. Opperman's vehicle was parked in violation of a Vermillion, S.D. ordinance which
prohibits parking in the downtown area between the hours of 2:00 and 6:00 A.M. After
the issuance of the two tickets, a police officer called for a tow truck. Prior to this time,
however, the officer made no attempt to identify or contact the car owner, despite the fact
that there were current South Dakota license plates on the vehicle. 428 U.S. at 389 n.7,
395.
7. State v. Opperman, - S.D. -, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975). The court concluded that
for an inventory search to be "reasonable" it must be strictly limited to the discovery of
items within the officer's plain view. The court, in reaching this decision, relied on the
test of "reasonableness" set out in United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
The court in Lawson stated, "[tihere must be a minimal interference with the individ-
ual's protected rights." Id. at 475.
8. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). On remand to the South Dakota Supreme Court, however, that
court chose to interpret the South Dakota Constitution as requiring greater protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures than the Federal Constitution. Article VI, section
11 of the South Dakota Constitution was held to prohibit routine inventory searches that
extend beyond plain view items. State v. Opperman, - S.D. .. 247 N.W.2d 673
(1976).
9. For purposes of this appeal, the Attorney General of South Dakota conceded that
an inventory is a "search." 428 U.S. at 370 n.6.
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tently has evaded this issue,"' other courts have reached conflicting
opinions." The New York Court of Appeals in a recent case adopted a
restrictive definition of search, 2 limiting it to intrusions that are made
"for the purpose of seizing things."' 3 That court distinguished inventory
procedures from criminal searches, which are investigative in nature
and undertaken with a view towards possible prosecution. Under this
view, police inventories could be conducted without limit since the
Fourth Amendment standard of "reasonableness" only applies to
"searches.""
The alternative view is to define "search" to include any unwarranted
intrusion by the police upon a constitutionally protected area. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted this broad interpretation, 5
reasoning that "[tlo consider an inventory procedure not to be a
'search' does violence to the concept of the Fourth Amendment as a
protection of the privacy of the citizenry against unwarranted invasion
by government officials.""' That court chose to disregard the intent of
the police in determining whether a particular intrusion was a "search."
Rather, it focused on the individual's reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. The basis for this view is the Supreme Court's rejection in an
earlier case of "an overly technical definition of 'search.' "' Also, as the
10. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), a footnote to the majority opinion
noted the question, but stated that it need not decide the issue since the petitioner had
conceded that the intrusion constituted a search. Id. at 442.
Most recently, in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), the Court stated that "not
every aspect of a routine automobile 'inspection' . . . necessarily constitutes a 'search' for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. There is no occasion in this case to define the exact
parameters of an automobile search." Id. at 897 n.3.
11. The majority of courts recognize that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever
the police intrude upon a constitutionally protected area, despite the lack of an investiga-
tive motive on the part of the police. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th
Cir. 1973);Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971);
Gagnon v. State, 212 So.2d 337 (Fla. App. 1968). Other courts, however, have interpreted
the Fourth Amendment to prohibit only those intrusions that are made with the intent of
seizing evidence. See, e.g., St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967); People
v. Willis, 46 Mich. App. 436, 208 N.W.2d 204 (1973); State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173
N.W.2d 372, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970); People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272
N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
12. People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1971).
13. See ALl, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §1.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1970).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
16. Id. at 472.
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). In Terry, the Court authorized the practice
of police "stop and frisk" searches. Thus, in certain limited circumstances a police officer
may stop a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons, even though the officer
[Vol. 26:834
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Court stated in Camara v. Municipal Court," a case involving the
Fourth Amendment requirements of a search made to enforce a munici-
pal housing code, "[ilt is surely anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."' 9
Once it is determined that an inventory is a search, the procedures
used by the police must comply with Fourth Amendment standards.
Generally, this means that searches must be conducted pursuant to a
search warrant,20 since unauthorized searches are "per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions."'" While a considerable number
of exceptions22 have developed, it is clear that none is directly applicable
to the inventory search situation."
does not have probable cause for an arrest. The Court, in its decision, reasoned that it is
better "to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the
public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light
of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness." Id.
The rationale of Terry applies to all types of searches, including inventory searches.
18. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
19. Id. at 530.
20. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). Contra, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting), in which Justice Black states that the test
under the Fourth Amendment should not be "the reasonableness of the opportunity to
procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances."
Justice Black's view is that the Fourth Amendment really prohibits "unreasonable
searches" and not warrantless searches. Id. at 509. This view has not, however, been fully
accepted by the majority of the Court.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976); United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 778 (1st Cir. 1976).
22. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (where an individual
consents to a search, the police may proceed without a warrant, provided the consent was
voluntarily given); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (permitting an officer
to make a warrantless search if he has a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he inadvertently comes across a piece of evidence in "plain view" incriminating
the accused); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (allowing a warrantless search
within an arrested person's "immediate control" to insure the officer's safety and to
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(permitting a warrantless search of the outer clothing of a person suspected by the police
of being involved in criminal activity, in order to discover weapons which might be used
to assault the officer); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (where the police are in
"hot pursuit" of a suspected criminal, they may conduct a warrantless search of the
premises into which he flees); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (where there
is probable cause to stop a car moving on the highway, the police may search it without a
warrant).
23. None of the exceptions apply in the inventory search because there is no probable
cause or suspicion involved and the owner has not given consent. But see Moylan, supra
19771
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Therefore, theoretically at least, the Court should require a search
warrant based on probable cause before the police are allowed to search
an individual's automobile. However, as Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Opperman recognized, 4 the typical inventory search is con-
ducted routinely, pursuant to standard police regulations. "There are
thus no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate."2" Conse-
quently, probable cause, as an element of Fourth Amendment analysis,
is inappropriate in analyzing the inventory search involved here.
Rather, the Court must proceed under the theory that a search may be
valid under the Fourth Amendment, even though there is no search
warrant and no probable cause, so long as the search is "reasonable."2
Thus, it is necessary to determine "reasonableness" by "balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails. ' 2 As one
court expressed it, for the police intrusion to be found reasonable under
the circumstances of this case, there must have been "a minimal inter-
ference with the individual's protected rights.1 2
note 2, in which the author argues that inventory searches must be analyzed under the
"plain view" exception to the search warrant requirement. See also text accompanying
notes 79-80 infra.
24. 428 U.S. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 383.
26. South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097 n.5 (1976). The Court made a
distinction between "routine administrative caretaking functions" and criminal investiga-
tions:
We have frequently observed that the warrant requirement assures that legal
inferences and conclusions as to probable cause will be drawn by a neutral
magistrate unrelated to the criminal investigative-enforcement process. With
respect to noninvestigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully within
governmental custody, however, the policies underlying the warrant require-
ment . . . are inapplicable.
Id. See also United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973). That court stated that
[wihen determining the legality of an automobile search, a court must deter-
mine its reasonableness under all the circumstances presented; a search which
is determined to be reasonable will not be held invalid for the failure to obtain
a warrant, even if it would have been practical to do so.
Id. at 473.
27. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S, 523, 536 (1967). In reaching this view on
"reasonableness," the Court recognized that the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials." Id. at 528.
28. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1973). Lawson involved a
conviction for illegal transport of a firearm, which was based on evidence obtained as a
result of an automobile inventory search. The court held that the evidence was illegally
seized, since the only justification for the search was "bare police custody" of the automo-
bile. Id.
SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court in Opperman purported to implement this balancing pro-
cess. It found three reasons for upholding the inventory search: protec-
tion of the owner's property, protection of police from lost property
claims, and protection of police from potential danger. These reasons
were balanced against the invasion of privacy. However, the Court held
that there is a "lesser expectation of privacy" in one's automobile.29
Unlike one's house, the automobile is constantly in public and is subject
to regulation. Thus, the Court found that the need to search outweighed
the minimal invasion of privacy.
The Court's holding that there is a "lesser expectation of privacy" in
one's automobile contradicts an explicit statement in an earlier deci-
sion3 that "[a] search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion
of privacy."3 The holding also misapplies the principle laid down in
Katz v. United States32 that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places. ' 33 Under Katz, the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
is co-extensive with the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy.
It is contended that Opperman had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his automobile. This interest cannot be ignored or
lightly considered in analyzing the reasonableness of the search in-
volved. The Court should have followed its earlier decisions and recog-
nized a right to privacy in one's automobile. It then should have bal-
anced the more than minimal invasion of privacy against the need to
search.
An analysis of the purported rationale for inventory searches is essen-
tial in order to determine the "reasonableness" of such searches.34 The
Court in Opperman set forth the most frequently cited justifications for
upholding the validity of inventory searches . 3 First, the majority as-
29. 428 U.S. at 368.
30. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). Ortiz involved a search of the defen-
dant's automobile by border patrol officers at a traffic checkpoint removed from the
border and its functional equivalents. The Court held that in the absence of consent or
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment forbids such searches. Even though Ortiz did not
involve an inventory search, the Court recognized that a person has an expectation of
privacy as to his automobile and that automobiles are not subject to unlimited search.
31. Id. at 896.
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. Id. at 351. The Court also stated that what a person "seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id.
34. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court stated the standard for
determining the validity of a search of a motor vehicle to be whether the search was
reasonable under all the circumstances. Id. at 62. See note 64 and accompanying text infra'
for a discussion of the Cooper decision.
35. 428 U.S. at 369-72.
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serted that inventorying the contents of impounded automobiles is nec-
essary to protect the owner's property while the vehicle remains in the
custody of the police. 6 However, when subjected to critical analysis, it
is clear that this purported rationale is without basis in fact. 7 The owner
supposedly is protected because the inventory procedure allows the po-
lice to safeguard unprotected valuables and results in a detailed listing
of all articles of personal property secured by the police. 8 This argument
fails in two essential respects, however: (1) there is nothing to prevent
the police from simply omitting a particular item of property from the
inventory list," and (2) there is no reason for the Court to assume that
all motorists want their property "protected" in this manner.," As the
California Supreme Court in Mozzetti v. Superior Court4 ' observed,
[Iltems of value left in an automobile to be stored by the police may
be adequately protected merely by rolling up the windows, locking the
vehicle doors and returning the keys to the owner. The owner himself,
if required to leave his car temporarily, could do no more to protect his
property. 2
The validity of this criticism is strikingly apparent in Opperman,
since at the time of the impoundment the car doors were locked and the
windows were rolled up. 3 In fact, in order for the police to inventory the
car for Opperman's "protection," they had to break into it." Clearly, if
36. Id. See also United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971); People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 272 N.E.2d 464, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945
(1971).
37. For a critical analysis of the purported rationales for inventory searches, see Com-
ment, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California: Warrantless Automobile Searches in
Illinois, 1968 U.ILL.L.F. 401, 407-08.
38. Moylan, supra note 2, at 207-08.
39. Id. at 208.
40. 428 U.S. at 392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. 4 Cal.3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971). In Mozzetti, the motorist was
injured in an automobile collision and was taken to the hospital. Before removing the
vehicle to the impoundment lot, the police conducted a routine inventory search of the
automobile, during which they seized a quantity of marijuana, found in a closed suitcase
on the back seat of the car. The Supreme Court of California reversed the conviction for
possession of marijuana, holding that the police violated the Fourth Amendment in seizing
an item during the inventory search which was not in plain view.
For a discussion of Mozzetti, see Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehi-
cles and the Exclusionary Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 197 (1972); Note, Police Inventory
of Items Beyond Plain View During Search of Automobile Stored After Accident Violative
of Fourth Amendment, 40 FORDHAM L. Rv. 679 (1972).
42. 4 Cal.3d at 707, 484 P.2d at 88-89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
43. Brief for Respondent at 2, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
44. Id. In a similar case which involved the police breaking into a locked car in order
to "inventory" it, the court stated:
[Vol. 26:834
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the automobile owner saw fit to leave valuable possessions in his unat-
tended vehicle, the police and the courts should respect that motorist's
judgment as to the degree of protection required for those items. It may
be contended that most motorists would prefer not to suffer such an
invasion of privacy45 under the pretext of protecting the car owner's
property.
The second purported rationale which the Court in Opperman set
forth to justify the inventory search is that it is necessary to protect the
police against lost property claims." It is difficult, however, to see how
the police could possibly be liable in such a situation. The South Dakota
Supreme Court's view of state law was that as "gratuitous depositors""
the police would only be obligated to secure those items of property in
plain view and to lock the car doors and roll up the windows. 8 Further-
more, under the law of bailments, an involuntary bailee generally is not
liable for items of property which are not clearly visible or of which the
bailee has no knowledge.49
In Opperman, therefore, the police, as gratuitous depositors, might
concededly have a duty of "slight care" towards those items of property
in plain view. However, it is difficult to conclude that the police would
owe any duty of care towards items of property in a closed glove com-
partment. To justify automobile inventory searches on the basis of
avoiding potential police liability is to rely on at best a makeshift argu-
ment that is deserving of no judicial support. 0
[lft is hard to see, when the car was locked and the windows rolled up at the
time it was impounded, how the property is better safeguarded by a breaking
into the car and locked trunk to inventory. In many cases, the value of the
property 'safeguarded' by these actions would be less than the damage caused
to the automobile by these 'protective' measures.
United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 1973).
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), recognized that what a person "seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." Id. at 351. Thus, as Justice Powell recognized in his concurring opinion in
Opperman, "Irloutine inventories of automobiles intrude upon an area in which the
private citizen has a 'reasonable expectation of privacy'" 428 U.S. at 377 n.1 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
46. 96 S.Ct. at 3096.
47. State v. Opperman, - S.D. -, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975). The court stated that
"[when in possession of an impounded car the police are acting as gratuitous deposi-
tors." Id. at 159.
48. Id. See also S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §43-39-11 (1967), which states that "[a]
gratuitous depository must use at least slight care for the preservation of the thing depos-
ited."
49. See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§1038, 1038A, at 900-07 (3d ed. 1967).
50. 428 U.S. at 391 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Dodge v. Turner, 274 F. Supp.
285 (Utah 1967), in which the court stated: "The claim that the officer had to search the
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Finally, relying on Cooper v. California,51 the Court in Opperman
contended that inventory searches of lawfully impounded automobiles
are justified as a "protection of the police from potential danger. '" 52
Under this approach, however, it would be possible to justify any search
merely by stating that the police officer involved had reason to fear for
his personal safety. For example, in a recent Delaware case53 involving
an automobile inventory search, the police attempted to justify a search
of a closed satchel in an impounded automobile on the grounds that it
may have contained explosives or other dangerous substances.54 The
court in that case wisely decided that such an argument was "too con-
jectural to fulfill the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonable-
ness of a search without a warrant."55 However, after the Court's de-
cision in Opperman, it is more likely that such far-fetched arguments
will be sustained by the courts in order to justify inventory searches
under the pretext of "protection of the police from potential danger."56
Thus, it is apparent that there is little support in fact for the Court's
view that inventory searches are necessary to protect either the car
owner's property or the police. However, the Court in its decision also
relied on the automobile exception established in Carroll v. United
States.7 The Carroll decision is inapposite because it involved a proba-
ble cause search of a car stopped on the highway, where it would have
been impractical to require the police to obtain a search warrant." In
car before impounding it because if he had not he could be held civilly liable for conversion
of articles which might be claimed to have been in the car and later not found, is spe-
cious." Id. at 291.
51. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
52. 428 U.S. at 369.
53. State v. Gwinn, 301 A.2d 291 (Del. 1973).
54. Id. at 295.
55. Id.
56. 428 U.S. at 369.
57. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the issue was the admissibility of certain contraband
liquor seized during a warrantless search of a car stopped on the highway. The Supreme
Court held that when there is probable cause to believe that a car stopped on the highway
contains evidence of crime, that vehicle may be searched without a warrant. The Court
recognized
a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153.
58. Id. See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), in which the Court
extended the Carroll rationale by holding that when the police have probable cause to stop
and search a car stopped on the highway, they may bring the car to the police station and
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the typical inventory search situation, however, there is neither proba-
ble cause nor the exigency of a fleeting vehicle. The mere fact that
inventory searches involve automobiles is not sufficient to invoke the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.59
The Court also is inaccurate in drawing an analogy between the inven-
tory search involved in Opperman and the searches in Cooper v. Cali-
fornia,60 Harris v. United States,"' and Cady v. Dombrowski.2 These
cases are distinguishable from Opperman, and do not, as the Court
asserts, "point the way to the correct resolution of this case.''"
Cooper involved the search of an automobile pursuant to a California
statute which authorized the police to impound any vehicle involved in
narcotics transportation, pending forfeiture proceedings."' The Court
upheld the search, stating that "[iut would be unreasonable to hold
that the police, having to retain the car. . . had no right, even for their
own protection, to search it.""e Cooper thus is distinguishable in that
there was a close relationship between the reason the vehicle was taken
into custody, the reason for the arrest, and the reason for the search."6
Such a relationship is lacking in the typical inventory search situation.
In Opperman, for example, there was no relationship between the reason
for the impoundment, a parking violation, and the subsequent arrest for
possession of marijuana. Nor was the vehicle impounded pursuant~to
forfeiture proceedings. Finally, the Court in Cooper recognized that
"lawful custody of an automobile does not of itself dispense with consti-
tutional requirements of searches thereafter made of it. ... ,7How-
ever, the Opperman Court did not acknowledge this conclusion of its
prior decision.
conduct a warrantless search of it.
59. United States v. Young, 489 F.2d 914,916 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), in which the Court commented that although the
Carroll decision created an exception to the search warrant requirement, "[it did] not
declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles." Id. at 269.
60. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
61. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
62. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
63. 428 U.S. at 375.
64. At the time of Cooper's arrest, section 11611 of the California Health and Safety
Code provided that any officer making an arrest for a narcotics violation could seize and
hold as evidence, a vehicle used to store, conceal, transport or sell narcotics, pending
completion of forfeiture proceedings. 386 U.S. 58, 60. The statute was repealed June 7,
1967.
65. Id. at 61-62.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id.
1977]
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Harris involved an inventory search of an impounded automobile
after the defendant's arrest for robbery. After conducting a thorough
inventory search, and while in the process of rolling up the windows and
locking the doors, the officer saw an automobile registration card in the
name of the robbery victim lying face up on the metal stripping over
which the door closed. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the
registration card was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
since it was in "plain view.""8 Harris is clearly inapplicable to the inven-
tory search involved here though, since it involved the seizure of evi-
dence in "plain view," which concededly, is not the case in Opperman.69
Finally, in Cady v. Dombrowski'" the Supreme Court upheld a war-
rantless search of an automobile that was impounded following a colli-
sion. The search was conducted solely because the local police had a
reasonable belief that the automobile contained a gun.7 Therefore,
Cady is of questionable authority in attempting to validate the routine
inventory search in Opperman, since the particular factual situation
involved in Cady was clearly the basis for the Court's decision. That
case is distinguishable on two grounds.72 First, in Cady, the owner of the
vehicle was incapacitated as a result of a collision and, therefore, was
unable to make his own arrangements for the storage and safekeeping
of his vehicle and its contents. In Opperman, however, there is no indi-
cation that the vehicle owner could not have made his own arrange-
ments for the safekeeping of his automobile. As Justice Marshall
pointed out in his dissent,73 the police should have attempted to contact
him. Second, in Cady, the police had reasonable grounds to believe that
the impounded vehicle contained a revolver that ultimately might be
used to threaten the public safety. In Opperman, however, there was no
68. 390 U.S. at 236. The "plain view" doctrine was set out by the Court in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The "plain view" doctrine permits a warrantless
search when the police officer has a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he inadvertently comes across a piece of evidence in plain view that incriminates
the accused. Id. at 466.
69. The state of South Dakota, in its brief, conceded that the intrusion had exceeded
the area of "plain view." See Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). See also 428 U.S. at 386-87.
70. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
71. In Cady, the driver of the automobile was a Chicago police officer who was incapaci-
tated as a result of a collision. The local police were under the impression that he was
required to carry his service revolver at all times. Thus, when they did not find the gun
on his person, they searched the automobile in order to protect the public from potential
harm. Id. at 437.
72. See Brief for Respondent at 12-13, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
73. 428 U.S. at 394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reason for the police to believe that the car contained anything danger-
ous.
Thus, it must be concluded that none of the three asserted justifica-
tions for the inventory search, nor the related decisions in Cooper,
Harris, and Cady, support the Court's holding in Opperman. However,
even if it is assumed that the police have a valid interest in inventorying
the contents of impounded automobiles, there are more reasonable
methods of reconciling those interests with the Fourth Amendment
rights of motorists.
ALTERNATIVES
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Opperman,74 set forth a
two step analysis"5 which seems to provide a suitable solution to the
inventory search problem. First, when it is feasible for the police to
ascertain ownership of the vehicle and to contact the owner, as in
Opperman, Marshall found no practical reason for allowing the police
to search a motorist's car without that person's consent. Clearly, if the
car is registered in the state, the police should, at a minimum, be re-
quired to make an effort to contact the owner. In many cases, the owner
could then decide for himself whether to consent to the inventory search
or to make his own arrangements for safeguarding the contents of the
automobile."6
In those cases when it is impossible to determine who owns a particu-
lar vehicle, or when the owner is ascertainable but cannot be contacted,
the police should be allowed to search a vehicle only when they have
''specific cause to believe that a search of the scope to be undertaken is
necessary in order to preserve the integrity of particular valuable prop-
erty threatened by the impoundment.""
Finally, the Court could have adopted the position of the California
Supreme Court,"' which recognizes the validity of inventory searches,
but limits their permissible scope to items in plain view. This would
preclude searches of such areas as the trunk and glove compartment.
74. 428 U.S. at 382.
75. Id. at 392-94.
76. It is difficult to imagine how a court could justify an inventory search when the
owner is contacted and indicates that he would prefer to make his own arrangements for
protecting the vehicle's contents, yet such a decision was upheld in two recent cases. See
St. Clair v. State, 1 Md. App. 605, 232 A.2d 565 (1967); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212
Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972).
77. 428 U.S. at 393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. 4 Cal.3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971). This is also the view that the
South Dakota Supreme Court, on remand, ultimately accepted on the basis of their state
constitution. See State v. Opperman, - S.D. - , 247 N.W.2d 673 (1976).
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This is inconsistent with the rationale for inventory searches since, if a
motorist keeps valuables in his automobile, they would most likely be
found in an enclosed area such as a glove compartment."9 However, this
approach does show greater respect for the automobile owner's privacy
and, as the majority admitted, there is some degree of privacy in auto-
mobiles which deserves judicial protection.
CONCLUSION
Despite reasonable alternatives, the Court in Opperman seems to
have adopted an inflexible rule which gives the police almost unlimited
power to search vehicles that happen to come into their possession. So
long as the police can argue that the search was merely an "inventory"
conducted pursuant to standard police procedure, the courts will find
the search reasonable. Despite Justice Powell's statement, in his concur-
ring opinion, 0 that "the unrestrained search of an automobile and its
contents would constitute a serious intrusion upon the privacy of the
individual . . . "," it is unclear what type of police conduct would be
held to constitute an "unrestrained search" of an automobile. The logi-
cal conclusion from Opperman is that the police may search a lawfully
impounded automobile with any degree of intensity they choose, short
of totally dismantling the vehicle. Despite possible investigatory police
motives in inventorying an automobile, the courts will feel constrained
to uphold the searches as "reasonable" if the police, acting pursuant to
standard police procedures, assert that they are merely protecting the
owner's property or protecting themselves from false property claims.2
Ultimately, if the Court's rationale is accepted, Opperman can be
viewed as the triumph of property rights over Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy rights." In the future, motorists can rest assured that, in the event
79. See Comment, supra note 37, at 407.
80. 428 U.S. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 379-80.
82. But see Altman v. State, 335 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1976), decided after the Supreme
Court decision in Opperman. That court reversed the defendant's conviction for posses-
sion of marijuana, ruling that it was unreasonable for the police to conduct an inventory
search of defendant's automobile when a friend was willing and able to take care of the
vehicle.
When the driver of a motor vehicle is arrested and a reliable friend is present,
authorized and capable to remove an owner's vehicle which is capable of being
safely removed; or when the arrestee expresses a preference as to towing service
and designates an appropriate carrier and destination for the vehicle, it is un-
necessary for the police to impound it. In either of these instances the rationale
for an inventory search does not exist.
Id. at 629.
83. 428 U.S. at 395-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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their automobile is impounded by the police for any reason, their per-
sonal property will be "protected" by means of an inventory search
conducted without a warrant and without probable cause. Such motor-
ists should be forewarned, however, that any incriminating evidence
that is found during such a "protective search" may form the basis for
a criminal prosecution.
Thomas M. Gorey
